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COPYCAflINC; FISCAL POLICIES OF STATES AND THEIR NEIGHBORS
ABSTRACT
This paper formalizes and tests the notion that state governments'
expenditures depend on the spending of similarly situated states. We find
that even after allowing for fixed state effects, year effects, and common
random shocks between neighbors, as state government's level of per capita
expenditure is positively and significantly affected by the expenditure
levels of its neighbors. Ceteris paribus, a one dollar increase in a state's












Princeton, NJ 08544"We do everything everyone else does."
—Arkansas State Senator Doug
Brandon, describing his state's
budgetary policies.t
1. INTRODUCTION
State and local governments consume a significant part of theeconomy's
annual output, about 14 percent of GNP. In addition, there isconsiderable
cross—sectional variation: in 1985, per capita direct expendituresranged from
$1,775 in Missouri to $4,166 in Wyoming.2 An enormous amount of theoretical
and empirical research has been devoted to explaining such differences.At
this time, however, there is no consensus concerning theprocess that
generates government spending decisions. Following the work of Slack [1948],
many investigators have found the median voter model to be a useful framework.
However, a number of other candidates also have their advocates, The
"Leviathan" model suggested by Brennan and Buchanan [1977], special interest
group models (Mueller and Murrell [1986]), and general "political economy"
models (Craig and Inman [1986]) are just a few that come to mind.3
When it comes to estimating the parameters of the various models, there
is a striking similarity regardless of the underlying theoretical framework,
In a generic estimating equation, a jurisdiction's spending depends on
income, jfl grants from other levels of government, and its demographic and/or
tApplebome [1989, p. 1.267]
2Tax Foundation, Inc. [1988, p. 174].
3See Inman [1988] for a survey of various models ofgovernment expenditure
determination
1political characteristics. Such differences in characteristics obviously need
to be taken into account. Fiowever, this paper proposes that there is another
important determinant of state and local government expenditures in the United
States: the expenditures of neighboring governments.
Casual observation suggests that jurisdictions' spending levels do affect
each other. When one state perceives that its spending levels are out of line
with those of similarly situated states, this often leads to demands for
change. For example, in April 1984 the governor of Texas called a speciaL
legislative session to consider a billion dollar increase in school
expenditures. Part of the reason was that a few months earlier "...astudy by
the Federal Department of Education found that Texas ranked next to last among
the states in the portion of income per capita spent on public education.
These and other indicators.. .spurred wide concern among Texans" (Reinhold
[L984, p. 173). Indeed, documents prepared for state legislators commonLy
focus on their state's spending in a given category reLative to other stares.
Thus, a 1988 report for the New Jersey legislature noted that "Since 1976, New
Jersey has ranked third or fourth nationally in per pupil expenditures"
(Program for New Jersey Affairs [1988, p. 76]).
In this paper, we formalize and test the notion that a state's spending
can depend on the spending of similarly situated states. Instead of the
somewhat awkward construction "similarly situated states", we will use the
word "neighbors". It must be stressed, however, that for our purposes.
nei,ghbQrtjness does not necessarily connote zeozraphic oroximity. States that
are economically and demographically similar may have more effect on each
4There is also anecdotal evidence that changes in a state's tax structure
are influenced by those of its neighbors. Because of the difficulties involved
in characterizing state tax structures (see Feenberg and Rosen [1986]), we prefer
to attack the relatively simpler expenditure issue.
2other than two dissimilar states that happen to sharea border. Citizens of
New York, for example, might find comparisons to Illinoismore relevant than
those to Vermont.
Section 2 lays out our theoretical framework.tie construct a simple
model in which the optimizing level of expenditure bya state decision—maker
is affected by the expenditure levels of that state's"neighbors." We discuss
the empirical specification in section 3. Specialattention is devoted to
resolving the econometric problems that arise because variousstates'
expenditure levels might be subject to common random shocks. Thedata, which
consist of annual observations for the continental United Statesduring the
period 1970—1985, are described in section 4.
The results are presented in section 5. A majorfinding is that even
after allowing for state individual effects,year effects, and correlated
random shocks between neighbors, a state's level ofper capita expenditure is
positively and significantly affected by the expenditure levels of its
neighbors. Ceteris uaribus, a one dollar increase in a state'sneighbors'
expenditures increases its own expenditure by over 70 cents. We alsoanalyze
spending in specific categories such as education, and there too other states
matter. Moreover, we find that failure to include neighbors'expenditures in
the equation leads to substantially different estimated effectsof other
important explanatory variables such as federal grants andage structure of
the population. In particular, failure to account forneighbor effects leads
to a substantial upward bias in the estimate of a state'sgrants upon its
ex!enditures. Section 6 concludes with a brief summary.
32. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are many reasons why one might expect the expenditures of one s:ac
to affect the fiscal policies of other states. In thissection,we outline
several possibilities that build upon traditional models of public expenditure
determination.
In simple normative models of government choice, governments concerned
with their citizens' well—being choose expenditure levels that equate the sum
of individual marginal behefits from public services to their marginaL coscs.±
Assume, for example, that all consumers in a state are identical, taxes are
lump—sum, and that only one type of public good is provided by the government.
Then the utility level of the (representative) consumer in state I can be
expressed as:
V1 V[Y —P,G] (2.1)
whereY is per capita income in state 1, Ttis the (lump—sum)tax burden of
eachconsumer, and C1 is the level of public services provided. The price of
private goods is the numeraire. If public services are measured in per—
consumer cost units, budget balance requires:
V￿ (2.2)
Now, define pt as the consumer's marginal willingness to pay for public
goods,p5'—OV'()/8G1/8V()/8CYt—Tt).Then if the state government seeks to
maximizeconsumersatisfaction (2.1), subject to the budget constraint (2.2),
thefirst—order condition is the familiar p11— 1 : atthe margin, the
5SeeSamuelson [1954]. This description abstracts from benefit spillovers
between communities and other potentially important phenomena.
4consumer's willingness to pay for the public good justequals the resource
cost of providing it.
Note that in this model, a state's expenditure level doesnot respond
directly to changes in the expenditures of its neighbors. Justas in the
empirical models discussed above, a state's expenditures are determined
entirely by variables relating to that state. However, we will show that with
a more complicated political or economic environment, expenditure
interdependence becomes a distinct possibility. Suppose, for example, that
government decision—makers have tastes for controlling large "empires" as
reflected in the size of C. (See Brennan and Buchanan [1977].) What holds
the potentially avaricious budget appetites of government decision—makersin
check? One mechanism that may limit state governments' abilitiesto
misallocate resources is political voice. Hirschman [1970] observes that
voice can be an effective method of forcing powerful entities torespond to
consumers or voters. Voice takes obvious forms in struggles over subnational
fiscal policies: dissatisfied citizens can (and do) complainpublicly about
their elected officials, they can vote for opposition candidates, andcan
contribute time and money to opposition election campaigns.6
Citizens may not, however, know to complain. It is hard to
establish de novo that any particular tax and spending package is wasteful.
After all, it is very hard to measur, the true flow of value fromgovernment—
6Anotherpossible response to governmental inefficiency is exit. (See
Tiebout (1956).) However, the Tiebout hypothesis assumes interjurisdictional
movement to be costless, an unlikely condition to be met by population movement
between states. The evidence suggests that such movement is rather uncommon.
In 1985, only 8.7 percent of Americans lived in a different state than they did
five years earlier. (U.S. Bureau of the Census (1986, p.25].) There is little
evidence that a significant fraction of this migration is driven by differences
in state and local fiscal policies. Another reason for preferring the voice
approach is that, as a framework for econometric analysis, an exit model has a
major drawback.If people shift in response to fiscal policies, then the
economic and demographic characteristics of the states become endogertous, and
the model is not identified.
5provided services. In our model, citizens Look to other states in order to
evaluate the performance of their own Legislators. In particuLar, suppose
that consumers compare their current utilities to the utility Levels they
would obtain if they lived in neighboring states. Suppose further that
legislators worry about the consequences of adverse political voice if they
offer their citizens a fiscal package worse than one obtainable in a
neighboring state. A possible objective function for such a government
decision—maker' is:
—Vt()+ — (i/2)(V —V')2[sgn(V—Vt)] (2.3)
7i' >
where V' is the level of utility the representative consumer in state i would
obtain if she moved to state j
V-—v[Y —T,cfl (2.4)
The first term on the right side of (2.3) expresses the degree to which
Legislators directly weigh the well—being of their own citizens, and the
second term expresses legislators' tastes for large empires. The third term
reflects the political costs government officiaLs pay for providing their
citizens a fiscal package that is worse than one available in neighboring
state j .Thesign of this quadratic terra is defined so that a state
government always faces incentives to improve the quality of its fiscal
Without elaboration, we consider the objective function (2.3) to represent
an approximation to the outcome of interest—group politics and other forces that
determine state and local fiscal policies.
6package.
Another consideration that would change the simple objectivefunction
(2.1) is fiscal competition among states. States use bothexpenditure and tax
policies to compete with each other for businesses. Businessesare desired
because they provide tax revenues. Furthermore, additional business
expands
local shopping and employment opportunities, and businessmay be involved in
beneficial activities such as supporting local charities. (Ofcourse,
businesses may also be associated with disamenities such aspollution and
congestion.) Let 8be state i's amount of "business," measured in dollars.
Then the simplest way to include a "taste'1 for more business is toaugment the
objective function (2.3) as follows:
—Vt()+ —(,2/2)(V'—V)2(sgn(Vt—Vt)J + y B (2.5)
li' 72' Y3> 0
If rtisthe tax rate on business in state i, the budget constraint becomes
+ r1 B (2.6)
Interdependence enters the picture because the amount of business that state i
attracts depends both on its own tax rate, r1, and the tax rate of its
neighbor, i-a:
St —B'(cyJ) (2.7)
6 Similarly, reductions in theutility available in other states are always
advantageous to legislators.
7where 8B/3r C 0 and dB/8r> Q.
The voice model and the fiscal competition model are not mutually
exclusive. NevertheLess, to simplify the exposition it helps to analyze them
separately. We begin with the voice model (72 > 0, y —0),and then turn to
the fiscal competition model (7a —0,7j > 0).
Voice model. Assuming for simplicity that Vt > V', the first—order
condition characterizing maximization of (2.3) over the choice of G', subject
to (2.2) is:
qL(pL 1) + + 72 A ''(c51—I) —1zA' (dV4'/dG') —0 (2.8)
where 'isthe marginal utility of income in state i and A' —(Va'—V1)is
the difference between the utility available to a citizen of state i in her
own state and that obtainable in state j.Thelast term on the left side of
(2.8) is a function of state j's expected response to spending changes in
state i. Assume that this term is zero. Then (2.8) becomes:
(P81 —1)—_/(,1 (1+ 7z AL)] (2.9)
Note that the right side of (2.9) approaches zero as either 71 becomes zero or
72 becomes very large. Thus, we will obtain efficient provision of public
goods (p8' —1)only when the weight on government expenditure per se (-y) is
low, or when the fact that citizens can obtain more utility in another state
Leads to a lot of trouble for legislators (7z is large). More generally,
91n addition, business executives might compare their own utilities in
states i and j along the lines suggested above. To keep things simple, we have
not included this factor in equation (2.7).If we did, it would serve to
reinforce the basic conclusion that one expects to observe expenditure
interdependence.
8(p— 1) is negative, reflecting government overprovisjon of publicgoods.
Equation (2.9) suggests how changes in a state's expenditures affectthe
spending decisions of its neighbors: the effect comes through the oterm in
the denominator of (2.9), and generally takes the form thatincreases in v
are matched by shrinking c (increasing p —1)
.Moreformally, totally
differentiating (2.9) and rearranging yields:
7z'Vi
+ .72)2(dp1t/dG' —2d'it/dC + ziaLu!.zil ) (2,10)
'l+y2t) (1 +
Diminishing marginal utility of government expenditures implies dp,u/dCt C 0.
If we are further willing to assume that d.11/dC > 0, then theright side of
(2.10) is negative.'0
An important question is whether states will necessarily match their
neighbor's spending changes. Not necessarily: states can be expected to
follow other states' spending increases, for example,only if spending
increases in other states increase va'. While this certainlymay be the case,
it is not necessarily true. For example, suppose that residents ofstate i
believe that i spends "too much," but that its neighbor, stateJ, spends "too
little." Then according to our model, if j were to increase itsipending,
legislators in i would reduce their spending.
Fiscal conetitiQn model. In this case, we set —0in equation
(2.5). The state chooses C1, T' and rtomaximize (2.5) subject to the
constraint (2.6). The three first order conditions can be combined to yieLd
the following equations
10Because dct —dT'in this model, either strong separability of the utility
function (2.1) and diminishing marginal utility of income diminishing marginal
utility of income and (uncompensated) complementarity of yt and C' are sufficient
conditions for dr7t/dct > 0.
9— —-y3/q— (2.11)
Ps17''1 (2.12)
where is the marginal utility of government expenditure (8V'/3C1) and, as
before, ,?Listhe marginal utility of income (8V"/8Y'). Our strategy is to
find the response of p'ii' to a shock in its neighbor's expenditures. Assuming
that 0Landits marginal utility move in opposite directions11, this will tell
us whether C increases or decreases.
Suppose théré is a "taste shock" in neighboring state j,meaningthat for
given values of (Y —T3)and G3, there is an increase in p83. From equation
(2.12) we know that p53 —1—-y1/q'3so that if pJ increases, so will ,and
C3. From equation (2.11), the impulse effect of this change is to raise r'——
the additional revenue to finance the increased government expenditure comes
partly through increased business taxes. How do these increases in r and C3
affect state i? Substituting the expression for ,impliedby equation (2.11)
into (2.12), and differentiating, we obtain
1 '3B' 32Bt
73( —Bt________] / (35L/3r1)2 I
dLi dr3 8r3 Br'
________ (2,13)
dr3 [r + B'/(38'/Brt)]'
We have already shown that changes in p57yare linked to C1, as are changes in
toC. Hence, equation (2.13) establishes our basic proposition ——
neighbors'expenditure levels are interrelated. In general, the sign is
indeterminate. Suppose, however, that the cross effects of tax rates on
11Asufficient condition for this to be true is that V'() is strongly
separable, and both of the componentsare globally concave.
10business location are zero (82 8' /3r',3T —0),and that the direct effect of
state j's tax rate change upon business in state i (8B'/3r)exceeds the effec:
generated by the induced change in state i's tax rate
((38t/3r1)(ört/3ri)j .In
this case, equation (2.13) indicates that 3p11j/ôrC 0, which implies that 8G'/3c
> 0, Thus, as in the voice model, it seems reasonable
to expect that
expenditures of neighbors will move in the same direction,although this is
not necessarily the case.
Summary. We have shown that in both a voice model anda fiscal
competition model of public expenditure, expenditures in onestate may be
affected by the expenditures of its neighbor, althoughone cannot know a
priori whether they wilL move in the same direction. A reasonablequestion is
whether it is feasible to distinguish between the two models.Data problems
would make this very difficult. We simply do not know whichtaxes and
expenditures are designed to attract business. Our goal, however, has beento
develop a choice theoretic framework to explain why there might be
interdependence among states' aggregate expenditures. For thisparticular
purpose, it does not matter whether one or the other of the mechanisms is
dominant.
A related observation is that both models arevery simple. For example,
they ignore the possibility that states will respond strategically to
budgetary changes in other states. (See Johnson (1988].) While incorporating
strategic behavior would enrich the models, it would not change the basic
conclusion —consistentwith casual evidence, we must take seriously the
possibility that expenditure levels in one state exert an independent effect
on expenditure levels in other states,
113.EAMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
3d Econometric Model
Our theoretical model implies that state i's per capita expenditures in
year t, E, depend on its own characteristics (a vector and the
expenditures of its neighbors. Continue to assume for simplicity that each
state has only one neighbor, with per capita expenditure E+,. Then in a
linear specification we can write:
— +*E + (3.1)
where $andare parameters, and is a random error.12
Several econometric studies of sub—federal government expenditure have
suggested that a state's public expenditures are characterized by an
individual effect —anunobserved characteristic of the state that influences
its fiscal decisions and does not change over time (for example, "climate" or
"political make—up"). (See Holtz—Ealcin [1986].) Hence, we use pooled cross—
section time series data, and augment equation (3.1) with an individual
effect. In addition, we allow for "time effects." (This amounts to including
a series of year specific intercepts.) The time effects are intended to
control for variables that might have a common effect on the states in a given
year, such as business cycle conditions, the "national mood" toward
government, etc. Also, year—to—year changes in federal matching rate programs
that change the effective price of spending for all states are subsumed in the
year effects. Including time effects is particularly important in the context
'2Equation (3.1) assumes that the neighbor effects are transmitted
concurrently, which is reasonable given that the data are yearly observations.
We also analyzed a model in which E._1 appeared on the right hand side, and
found that it did not perform as well as (3.1) —with the value of the
log likelihood was substantially lower than with
12of our problem, because we do not want to attrthuce behavioralsignificance to
anyacross—state correlations in spending that are really due tocommon
national influences.
In short, our estimation equation takes the form
—Xfi+ +f,+h÷
(3.2)
where f and h are the individual and year effects,respectively.
As stressed above, the unique aspect of equation (3.2) is thepresence of
the neighbor's expenditure as a right hand side variable.'3 The inclusion of
raises several related issues that have to be addressed.
MultiDle neizhbors. A state may have more than one neighbor. In the
context of our voice model, citizens of a given state compare themselves
simultaneously to those of several other states —peoplein New Jersey, for
example, might be concerned about developments in both New York and Michigan.
Similarly, with a fiscal competition model, a state may try to lure away
business from several other states. This does not imply that allneighbors
have equal influence. The impact of state j on state i's spendingmay, for
example, depend on the extent to which they are demographically similar. A
state that is very much "like" Wisconsin will have more of an impact on
Wisconsin's decisions than one that is less so. We assume that the impact of
other states' spending on state i depends on a weighted average of all other
states' spending, where the weights depend on the "degree of neighborliness."
Specifically, we allow for the possibility of multiple neighbors by replacing
in equation (3.2) with
'3Grainljch and Laren [1984) estimate a model in which a state's welfare
expenditures are influenced by those of surrounding states. However, their model




where E Wjj —I,and wu —0if state j is not a neighbor of state
Every state is associated with a vector of w's that indicates the
relative importance of its neighbors' expenditures. We take note of this
fact by writing the system of expenditure equations for all the states inyear
tinmatrix form,
E —WEt+Xfl+u (34)
where E is a (48 x 1) vector of state expenditures for the continental U.S.
in year t;Xis a (48 x k) matrix of explanatory variabl.es that includesyear
and state effects; and W is a (48x48) weighting matrix that assigns neighbors
to every state. That is, the ith row of W assigns to a weighted average
of neighbors' spending: L w1 In principle, it would be desirable to
estimate the elements of the IJ matrix along with the other parameters. In
practice, such an approach is out of the question because of insufficient
degrees of freedom. We discuss below strategies for specifying 1.1 a priori,
and the problems associated with each. For the moment, however, we willput
this issue aside, and continue the discussion assuming that the W matrix is
known.
Correlated random shocks. While the presence of time effects in the
model controls for systematic influences common to all states in a givenyear,
neighbors might be subject to correlated random shocks. For example, if
neighbors are defined by physical proximity, state cleanup of floods or shared
"That weights sum to one for each state's neighbors imposes the restriction
that all states have neighbors.
14toxic waste sites would lead to positively
correlated random shocks between
neighbors. If a foreign company selects a state inwhich to place a new
factory, the company's short list of possible sitesmay include states that
are close demographic neighbors. To the extent thatstate i's selection as
the new site influences the state's
spending, the choice of state i over its
neighbors would induce negative correlation in theerrors of neighbors13
Whatever their cause, the presence of such shocksproduces a correlation
between neighbors' levels of spending thatcan lead one to "find" causal
influences of one state's spending on another's thatare not actually present.
To avoid drawing such incorrect conclusions,we allow for potential
correlation between the errors of neighbors bywriting
Ut —pWu+
(3.5)
whereis idiosyncratic error, uncorrelated betweenstates: E(e1te) —0for
i not equal to j
Analogous to the time series phenomenon in which thepresence of a lagged
dependent variable [Y —(-.1)] andserial correlation [tat —f(u_1)]mimic
each other, in this work there is potential fordependence on neighbors
through spending (E) and through errors (u) to mimic eachother. As with time
series, the presence of other right—hand side variables()Q can be used to
identify the effects separately.
£irni4ltanepus estimation of exDenditures acrossstates. As Equation (3.4)
stands it cannot be estimatedconsistently since the errors are correlated
13To see this more formally, considerreplacing (2.7) with B1
in which c is a random shock to the level ofbusiness in state i (3B/8ct >0).
Then e1 affects tax collections andoptimal state tax and expenditure policies;
under normal circumstances dC/dc > 0. If c'and c3 are negatively correlated
for neighbors i and ii then the residuals inthe two states' spending equations
(3.2) may exhibit negative correlation as well.
15with the right—hand side dependent variables. But inverting the system5
aLlows us to remove the dependent variables from the right—hand side:
E —(IWY'Xfl +(I—W)'(I—pW)'. (3.6)
In (3.6), where the potential correlation between errors of neighbors has also
been incorporated, expenditure is now written as a nonlinear function of
exogenous variables X. 1ote that ignoring the presence of correlation in
neighbors' errors would not bias estimation of fi,butwould reduce the
efficiency of the estimation and produce biased estimates of standard errors.
Ignoring the influence of neighbors' levels of E can cause more severe
problems. If state i's neighbors expenditures belong in (3.6), but are
ignored, state i's right—hand side variables (Xi) are correlated with state
i's errors, leading to inconsistent estimates of fi.
Equation(3.6) indicates that despite the constancy of the fivectoracross
states, the ultimate effect of a change in an exogenous variable differs
across states. When one of the Xs changes exogenously in state i, the induced
change in E1 then affects spending by state i's neighbors. These changes feed
back to state i through #W and induce a tertiary effect on E. Because two
neighbors may weight each other differently, the diagonal elements of (I—Wy'
vary between states,
-
andthe ultimate effects of changes in X differ.
Algebraically, a change in state i's level of a single exogenous variable x,
after allowing for reverberations between state i and its neighbors, can be
written:
16The matrix (I —*W)is invertible iflies strictly between (—1,1). See
Case [1987, Appendix 3] for a proof and discussion of this result.
168 E1
where A is the (ii) element of (i—W)'.
Intuitively, one expects the
derivatives in (3.7) to differ substantially from
fiinthe presence of large
neighbor effects ()forthose states with close neighbors.
We estimate (3.6) using maximum likelihoodmethods. Defining A —
(I—W-and C —(I—pW)1,the likelihood function (L) for (3.6)can be
written,
L —constant—N/2ln(E'C'A'M A C E) + ln JAI + In C (38)
where the likelihood has been concentrated withrespect to fiand2; and
where (In IAI + ln c) is the log of the Jacobianof the transformation
between c and E; M is the matrix [I —AX(X'A'AXy1 X'A'J; and N is the total
number of observations. Maximum likelihood estimatescan be obtained using
standard non—linear estimation techniques. See Case[1987] for details.
3.2 Soecifying the Weizhtinz Matrix.
Estimation of the system requires that we determine whichstates are -
neighbors.We indicated earlier that estimating theparameters of the W
matrix is infeasible, so that its elements must bespecified a priori.
According to the theory developed in Section 2, state j is aneighbor of state
i if the citizens and/or decision—makers ofstate i take into account state
i's fiscal package when they are evaluating their ownstate'ssituation.
Unfortunately, this does not give us too much guidance withrespect to
observable variables that would tell us whether twostates are neighbors.
An obvious possibility is geographicalproximity —twostates are neighbors
17if they share a common border, for example. However, it is not obvious that
geography is the most relevant factor. In terms of the voice model, citizens
might compare their well—being to those of people in states that are
demographically similar. If so, then states with similar racial compositions
would view themselves as neighbors. Alternatively, in a fiscal competition
model, certain types of businesses might prefer high (or low) income states to
others. In this case, decision—makers would view themselves as competing with
other states with similar income levels. In short, states may regard as
neighbors other states that are similar to them economically or demographi-
cally. regardless of geographical proximity.
These considerations suggest that we explore several alternative criteria
for neighborliness, and see which one is most consistent with the data. We
construct W matrices based on geography, per capita income, and percentage of
the population that is black."
This procedure is somewhat arbitrary. However, we stress that the
typical practice of ignoring neighbor effects also amounts to an arbitrary
assumption: that parameters describing the relationships between neighbors
are equal to zero. There is no reason why the arbitrary assumption that
—p—0should have primacy over all other values of *andp. In addition,
we reduce the arbitrariness of our neighbor selection process by nesting
potential candidates for neighborliness in order to test the strengths of
various measures. For example, in order to test whether income or geography
is a better way to characterize neighborliness, we can nest these two
criteria:
"We also constructed ti matrices based on proportion of population employed
in agriculture, in manufacturing, in services, and in trade.None of these
criteria improved the likelihood as much as geographic neighbors did, and further
analysis was not carried out using these W matrices.
18W — +
andestimate the model, varying a between 0 and 1.By comparing the
likelihoods of the models while varying a, we can assess the meritsof
different candidates for neighborliness.'6
Once we have selected a criterion (or criteria) for neighborliness,we
stilL face the problem of using it to compute the individual elementsof W.
This step requires that some assumptions be made. Consider thegeographical
criterion, for exampLe. One possibility is to make this a dichotomous
variable: to set —1if states i and j share a common border,w —0
otherwise, and specify wu —co,/k,where k —2ij'Analternative is to view
proximity as a continuous variable, One could define d14 as the distance
between the capitals of states i and jset —l/d,and construct
fromas before. One might also try 0ij— l/d12or — This
highlights another potentiaL stumbling block indefining neighborliness: even
after we have specified the qualitative nature of the criterion, a decision
regarding functional form must be made. However, we found that in practice
various measures of distance between neighbors yield similar results, as long
as the measures are powerful enough to select asmallnumber of states as a
given state's neighbors.'9
t8This idea was suggested to us by James Poterba.
t9For example, using qj as the characteristic according to which neighbors
are being measured, the distance measures —l/Iq—qIand —l/(q1—q)
yield answers that are insignificantly different from one another.Other
measures we tried (for example Wjj— l/[l+(log(q/q3)]2did not single out any
states as more neighborly than others. AsA consequence, the algorithm for
maximizing (3.8) did not converge.
19We estimated equation (3.6) using combinations of the following
alternatives for W:
W°. neizhbors with common borders. —l/Sif i and j share a border;
—0otherwise; and Si —thenumber of borders state i shares.
Wt. neighbors with sirnil.ar incomes. —l/IINC—1NCjI/S1where INC1 is
per capita income in state I (mean over sample period)20; and S is the sum
S l/IINC1—INCJ
W3. neihbprs with similar Dropprtions of blacks in their oooulatipns.
V13— l/IMACK—BLACKjI/SjwhereBLACK1isthe proportion of state i's popu—
lation that is black (mean over the sample period); and S1 is the sum
E 1/IBLACKS—BL.ACKJ I.
4.QAIA
Weestimate the model using annual data on the continental U.S. over the
period 1970—1985. All dollar figures are put on a per capita basis, and
deflated using the personal consumption expenditure deflator. (The baseyear
is 1982.) Our measure of government expenditures for state I inyear t,
is the sum of the direct expenditures of state and localgovernments,
exclusive of expenditures for interest, state—run liquor and utilityconcerns,
and insurance. An alternative strategy would have been to analyze state but
not local government expenditure. However, wide cross—sectional variation in
the division of spending responsibilities between state and local
jurisdictions, along with the possible substitutability of state and local
spending in response to exogenous changes, make the current approach of
aggregating state and local expenditures less likely to run afoul of features
20Because W' depends on between state differences inmean income while the
X vector depends on within state differences in income, there is no induced
correlation between the X vector and the error term.
20of political hierarchy.
The following variables comprise the Kit vector ofequatidn (3.2): real
per capita income, income squared, real per capita total federalgrants to
state and local governments, population, proportion of thepopulation at least
65 years old, proportion of the population between 5 and 17years old, and
proportion of the population that is black. This selection of
conditioning
variables is fairly uncontroversial. Income and grants aremeasures of the
resources available for state and local spending. The square of income picks
up possibly nonlinear effects of changing resources and also the effect of
federal deductibility on the cost to citizens of state and local taxes.21
State population captures the possibility that there are congestion effectsor
scale economies in the provision of state and local government services.
States with different age and racial structures may have different demands for
publicly provided goods —hencethe presence of the demographic variables.22
In addition the conditioning matrix X contains state and year indicator
variables. Federal matching rate programs exert potentially important
influences on state and local spending. Year—to—year changes in the structure
of these programs affect all states similarly; hence, their impact is subsumed
in the time effects.
We also estimate our basic equation for selected categories of spending.
The categories studied are: expenditures on health and human services (health
2tFor a taxpayer who itemizes deductions, the cost of an additional dollar
of state and local tax payments is only one minus her marginal federal tax rate.
Since marginal federal tax rates (and the propensicy to itemize) are nonlinear
functions of income, we include income squared to proxy for the price effect of
federal deductability.As a consequence, we are unable to disentangle the
resource effect and the tax price effect of income changes, but this is not
necessary for our purposes.
22Data are from the following sources: Expenditure, grant, and state per
capita income are from the Bureau of Census, U.S. Covernment Finance Series; data
on population demographics are from Current Population Reports and unpubli.shed
data from the Bureau of Census consistent with the Current Population Reports.
21and hospital spending plus public welfare expenditures); expenditures on
administration (financial administration and general control); expenditures on
highways; and expenditures on education.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for these data; the numbers
represent unweighted averages of state means, so they differ slightly from
national averages. Of the average annual total state and local expenditure of
$1,865 per person, 40% is spent on education ($146); 20% on health and human
services ($367); and 12% on highways ($220). The coefficients of variation
for these expenditure categories reveal that there is a great deal more




Testina the Neighbor Model. Table 2 presents the results of estimating
model (3.6) for state and local expenditures. The first column presents
conventional OLS results; these can be estimated in our framework by
constraining —p—0.The results are not dissimilar to those found in the
literature. Here, we see no significant effect of population on per capita
spending; economies of scale and congestion effects either offset each other,
or are not present. Both state per capita income and income squared are
significant. As mentioned earlier, these represent both resource effects and
tax price effects; we do not attempt to distinguish between them. The
coefficient on grants (1.03) suggests that, ceteris paribus, states spend
roughly one dollar for each dollar obtained in grants. This is an enormous
effect compared to the derivative of spending with respect to changes in
personal income (0.07 at mean income). This "flypaper effect" —theapparent
proclivity of subnational governments to spend much more out of their grant
22income than personal income of their residents —hasbeen observed by several
researchers.23 The results in the first column of Table 2 alsosuggest that a
0.01 increase in the proportion of elderly in the state population, cererjs
paribus,reduce state per capita spending by about $67, and a 0.01 increase
in the proportion black reduces state per capita spending by about $16.
Columns (2), (3), and (4) present the results using geographic proximity,
per capita income, and proportion black, respectively, to define
neighborliness. A striking result is that any of these specifications
suggests that neighborliness matters. For WE and W5, one can reject the joint
hypothesis that—p—0by a wide margin. For W°' one cannot quite reject
this joint hypothesis, but on an individual basis, and p are statistically
significant. 24
Given the success of all the W matrices exhibited in Table 2, a skeptical
reader might wonder whether there is something inherent to the econometric
procedure that produces significant results regardless of how "neighbors" are
defined. In order to investigate this possibility, we re—estimated the model
with an intentionally absurd W matrix. Specifically, we set —1if state
j followed state i in the alphabet, and zero otherwise.5 The estimates of
#andp were both less than l0' in absolute value, an4 the log likelihood did
not change measurably. Of course, there are an infinite number of silly
criteria that one could use to construct a J matrix. This experiment with an
alphabetical criterion, along with a few others, convinced us that the results
23See, for example, the papers surveyed by Inman [1979J
2The joint hypothesis is examined by using a likelihood ratio test: twice
the difference in log likelihoods is distributed chi—square with 2 degrees of
freedom. Using geography as the weighting matrix, this statistic is only 4.57
while the 95% critical value is 5.99.
"The last state, Wyoming, was assigned the second to the last state,
Wisconsin, as a neighbor.
23in columns 2 through 4 are not merely artifacts of the statistical procedure.
As an additional check on the model, we ran OLS regressions of state
expenditure on exogenous variables X and neighbors' exogenous variables WX.
Neighbors' variables, (IX, were found to be jointly significant. It could be
argued that the reason neighbors' X's (or expenditures) are statistically
significant is that the states' own X's are measured with error, and the
neighbors' X's (or expenditures) just happen to be proxying for the true
values of the own X's. Of course, such an interpretation can be given to
virtually any right hand side variable in any regression model. As always.
one must makea judgement as to which interpretation is more plausible.Is it
really believable that Michigan's expenditures affect New Jersey's
expenditures because Michigan's expenditures are helping to improve the
measurement of New Jersey's per capita income? We think not. The
"copycatting" interpretation suggested by our theoretical model is more
persuasive.
The increase in the log likelihood is most marked in the case in which
neighbors are defined as states with similar racial compositions. The use of
W' increases the log likelihood a full 40 points above the case in which both
coefficients of correlation are constrained equal to zero. The chi—square
test for significance is 80; and p are jointly significant with a
probability of 0.9999.
We can confirm the superiority of the W3 matrix by nesting neighbor
assignment based on geographic proximity with W5, and nesting assignment based
on income with W3. In both cases, the maximum likelihood is obtained by
assigning all weight to proportion black. Algebraically, if tJ —aW3÷ (1—
a)Wt the maximum likelihood is reached at a —1.
Several readers of an earlier draft of this paper suggested that
proportion black "must be proxying for something else," perhaps the income
24distribution or degree of urbanization of the population. Inresponse, we
constructed W matrices based on proportion of the population below thepoverty
line (in 1980) and on the proportion of the populationliving in meropo1itan
areas (in 1980). Neither of these criteria improved the log Likelihoodas
much as W6; indeed, neither did as well as W°. Another possibility is chat
the success of the W3 matrix simply reflects the high correlation between
spending and region of the country. Of the nine states with the highest
proportion black, eight are in the south and one (Maryland) is a border
state. To investigate this possibility, we deleted these nine states from the
sample and re—estimated the model, With this smaller sample, —0:7103
(s.e.— 0.0367) and p ——0.7732(se.— 0.0538).26 These results are
essentially identical to those in column (4) of Table 2. Hence, our results
are not due to the dominance of a "region effect."
On the basis of these experiments, we feel that the results in Table 2
should be taken at face value: racial composition has an important impact on
state expenditure patterns, and states with similar racial compositions look
to each other as points of reference. One should note that the importance of
race in state and local public finance is well established: Craig and Inznan
(1986, p. 203], for example, show that proportion black is a statistically
significant determinant of state spending; Cramlich and Rubinfeld (1982, p.
547] argue that micro demand equations for some public budget items are
Affected by race; and according to Aronson and Mariden (1980, p. 101], even
Moody's municipal credit ratings of a jurisdiction are influenced by its
racial composition, ceteris oaribus In short, we view the success of the W8
matrix as noteworthy, but not anomalous.
lntervreting the Coefficients. Because our preferred specification is
26The chi—square test statistic for the joint significance of the twc
parameters is 63.80.
25the one in column (4) of TabLe 2, we discuss chose coefficients. Note the
strikingly large, positive significant degree of correlation in the level of
expenditure between neighbors (— 0.7256),and the negative and significant
degree of correlation between neighbors' errors (p ——0.7753).The
correlation in states' expenditures suggests that the ultimate effect ofa
spending increase by state i's neighbors is, ceteris øaribus, to increase
state i's spending by seventy—three cents.
Furthermore, incorporation of neighbors' expenditures into our analysis
substantially changes the parameter estimates for the explanatory
variables, X. The effect of state population becomes positive and obtains
marginal significance, suggesting that if state population increased by
one million, state spending per person would increase by ten dollars. The
increase in spending out of grants, ceteris paribus, drops from the dollarfor
dollar estimate in column 1 to sixty—six cents on the dollar in column4,
diminishing the impact of the "flypaper effect. One interpretation of this
difference is that conventional estimates of the flypaper effectoverstate its
impact by ignoring simultaneous changes in other jurisdictions. Since federal
grants are often made available to many states at the same time, each state's
expenditure responses are magnified by its neighbors' spending changes, which
are induced by the same federal grant program. The spendingimpact of
proportion elderly also diminishes with the inclusion of stateneighbor
effects; its coefficient falls in magnitude from —6667 in column 1to —1988 in
column 4. Interestingly, the coefficient onproportion black becomes
insignificant in column 4. This suggests that the influence ofrace found in
conventional equations is not due to the fact that racialcomposition directly
affects tastes for public expenditure. Rather, the channelthrough which race
operates is the determination of states' neighbors.
The presence of neighbors changes not only themagnitudes of the fl's; it
26affects their interpretation as eU, As su&gested byequation (3.7)the
ultimate effect of a change in a iight—hand side variable on stite
expenditure
differs from fi, due to interactionsamong states, Specifically, to compute
the effect of a conditioning variable on state i, one mustmultiply that
variable's $ by &',the(ii) ?leruent of the matrix (I—Wy'. We computed
the diagonal elements of A arresponding to the estimates in column(4) of
Table 2; i.e., —Wand—0.7256.We found that few values of A"
exceeded 1,10. (A table with all the values is availableupon request.) For
most states, then, the change in expenditures induced by a change in X isnot
very different from fi.Hence, the first impression one gets from compring
columns (1) and (4) of Table 2 is correct: standard models that ignore
neighbor effects substantially overstate the size of response parameters.
The A matrix also can be used to calculate the cross effeots of one
state's X variables on the spending of other states. Specifidally,suppose
that the conditioning variables in state i change by dXi. Then the ultimate
effect of this change on state j is A$ dX1. By the definition of the A
matrix, the cross effects depend on how neighborly states are —theeffect of
state i on any state j dies away i i is distant from j .Indeed,for most
states, the cross effects appear to die away quite rapidly with "distance'."
Our computations for New Jersey, for example, suggest that A1 —0.57for its
closest neighbor, but only O.OS for its fourth closest neighbor.
5.2 Categories of SDending
As suggested earlier, there is no reason to assume that patterns of
expenditure interdependence are the same for all categories of spending. In
the voice model, for example, the sign and magnitude of the impact in state i
of an expenditure change in neighboring state j depends on the change. in
potential utility (Va') produced by the expenditure change; this effect may be
positive for some spending categories and negative for others. 'urthermore,
27heterogeneous consumers within a state may desire different services, pay
taxes at different rates, and have different abilities to influence their
state's fiscal policies in response to changes in neighboring states.
To explore these possibilities, we estimate the model separately for four
different types of expenditures: health and human services, administration,
highways) and education. These categories account for 75% of total
expenditure. Omitted categories include fire and police protection and
expenditures on the environment. In order to keep down the number of
computations, we use only the W3 matrix for estimation. That is, we assume
that the criterion for neighborliness that does best for total expenditures
also is most suitable for the various categories.2' We continue to analyze
expenditures on a per capita basis, except for education, where we deflate
expenditures by the number of school—aged children.2°
The results are presented in Table 3. Chi—square test statistics for the
joint significance ofand p are presented at the bottom of each column.
Strikingly, in each category one can reject the hypothesis that taking into
account interdependence does not enhance the explanatory power of the
equation. Apparently, the results for aggregate expenditures that we found in
Table 2 are not due to the dominating presence of a single spending category
for which neighbor effects matter.
27However, a persuasive case can be made that, for highway expenditures,
geography is more relevant than demographics for determining
neiborliness. We therefore estimated the highway equation using WGaswell as (4 .Thechi—
square test for the joint significance of #andp using tP is 48.36. This is
more that twice the value obtained using ¶J3(Seethe discussion of Table 3
below.)
Z&In theory, one might want to use aseparate deflator for every expenditure
category—highway expenditures per automobile, for example. However, only for
education is it fairly obvious what the appropriate deflator should be.
286. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Subnationalgovernments do not make their decisions in isolation.
Citizens and public servants are Likely to have information relating to
governxnenta]. activity in neighboring states, and this information is likely to
affect what they want their own state government to do. In this paper, we
employ data on state and local spending in the continental U.S. to test a
model that explicitly allows for such expenditure interdependence. We find
that states' expenditures are indeed significantly influenced by their
neighbors. In our preferred specification, the impact effect of a dollar of
increased spending by a state's neighbors increases its own spending by more
than seventy cents. This expenditure interdependence appears even though our
model allows for individual effects on state spending, year effects that might
affect all states in the same year systematically, and unobserved shocks that
might induce spurious correlation in neighbors' expenditures.
The most difficult methodological problems in this study arise in the
course of assigning neighbors. What frame of reference do people use in
evaluating the adequacy of their own state's fiscal package? Theory does not
provide firm answers, so we experiment with several alternatives. One measure
of neighborliness, similarity in racial composition as measured by percent of
the population that is black, performs significantly better than any other.
The selection of criteria for neighborliness inevitably introduces some
arbitrariness into the analysis. We find it extremely encouraging, then, that
each of several reasonable alternatives suggests that interdependence is
present. And each does better (in the sense of statistical significance) than
the conventional assumption that no interdependence is present.
We also showed that taking into account neighbor effects substantially
changes the estimated impacts of various conditioning variables on state
expenditures. This suggests that conventional estimates of the impact of
29grants on state and local expenditures might be wide of the mark. Moreover,
the importance of neighbor effects casts doubt on the validity and usefulness
of several popular models of government behavior. Neighbor effects might be
present because governments lack complete information on the costs and
benefits of public services, and hope to learn about these by looking at other
states. Alternatively, as observed in Section 2, neighbor effects could arise
because governments are not attempting to maximize efficiency at all. In any
case, it is not easy to reconcile the conventional view that fully informed
governments choose fiscal policies that maximize the well—being of their
citizens with the observed importance of neighbor effects.
Finally. we note that "copycatting" need not be confined to subfederal
jurisdictions. For national governments, there is some anecdotal evidence
that even apart from considerations of macroeconomic coordination, fiscal
policies in one country are affected by people's perceptions of changes in
other countries. Andersson t1988, p. 2] notes that a "factor precipitating
the (recent Scandinavian] tax reforms was the tax reforms undertaken elsewhere
in the 1980's. The Scandinavian countries.. .have by tradition always
carefully followed developments in other countries." Similarly, McLure [1988.
p. 281 states that one of the reasons that Colombia adopted income tax
indexing was that indexing was being considered in countries that Colombia
wanted to emulate. The extent to which nations' budgetary policies affect
each other is an important topic for future research.
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32- TableI
Variables Used in Analysis of State Spending
Variable Mean S.D. MinimumMa,d,num StandardCV
Value Value Error
nE Mean
Total 1865 304.7 1363 2826 3.97
expenditure
Health and 367.3 96.49 235.7 745.5 13.93 26.26
human services
Highway 219.7 74.71 11.7.2 520,5 10.78 36.01
Administration 81,77 22.37 51.01 157.1 3.229 27.36
Education 745.8 123.7 561.2 1180 17.86 16.59
Population (106) 4.541 4.640 0.425 22.61 0.670 102.2
Income 10050 1274 7350 12837 183.9 12.67
Grants 430.1 90.13 285.0 770.0 13.01 20.95
Prop. elderly 0.109 0.017 0.076 0.168 0.003 15.72
Prop. school age0.228 0.012 0.201 0.261 0.0025.187
Prop. Black 0,112 0.088 0.006 0.362 0.013 78.70
Sources: Expenditure, grant and state per capita income data are from the
Bureau of Census, Government Finance Series, General Revenue Tables. Data
on population are from Current Population Reports and unpublished data
from the Bureau of Census consistent with the CPR.
Notes:
1. All dollar figures are real per capita expenditure dollars.
2. Total expenditure is the sumofdirect expenditures of state and local
governments, exclusive of expenditures for interest, state—run liquor
and utilities concerns, and insurance.
3. Health and human services expenditure includes spending on health and
hospital expenditures plus public welfare expenditures.Table 2
Estimation of State Expenditure Levels 1970—85
Using Different Measures of Neighbor Characteristic
(standard errors in parentheses)
Model feog wtncome .81ack
Coefficient of spatial — —0.2271 0.1246 0.7256
correlation in dep.var. () (0.1045) (0.0972) :0.0324)
Coefficient of spatial — 0.3022 —0.3210 —0.7751
correlation in errors (p) (0.0899) (0.0999) (0.0485)
State populatton* —1.0943 —2.1049 —1.1324 1.1761
(1.1809) (1. 1698) (1.. 1157) (08935
State per capita income 0.1408 0.1344 0.1109 0.1576
(0.0328) (0.0339) (0.0310) (0.0248)
State per capita income2*—0.3589 —0.3329 —0.2233 —0.6741









Proportion of population —6666.6 —6921.7 —6798,4 —1.987.6
above age 65 (786.66) (871.90) (748.69) (870.27)
Proportion of population —474.63 —351.34 —391.71 75.753
aged 5—17 years (692.72) (724.60) (692.65) (559.94)
Proportion of population —1648.6 —1642.1 —2549.4 78.755
Black (781.27) (704.96) (754.67) (540.86)
CM square test statistic's 4.574 14.772 79.498
*Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 10g.
+ For column j ,cM.square test statistic is twi'e the difference in log
likelihoods between models in column J and column 1.It is distributed
chi square with 2 degrees of freedom.e
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